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Dynamic economic models usually describe the path of economic variables
as prices, consumption or capital at equilibrium. The most popular mod-
els assume that agents have perfect foresight. Implicitly this assumption
requires that agents can compute the complete inﬁnite path, an exercise
that requires to solve a system of equations involving an inﬁnite num-
ber of equations and unknowns. Equivalently, one could assume that
there is a well behaved and fast mechanism driving the economy to the
temporary equilibrium. A major diﬃculty is that the behavior of the
consumers in any given period depends on the present and all the fu-
ture prices. In the paper, we consider an overlapping generation model
in which the consumers form expectations using truncated versions of the
model. The mechanism of price adjustment may then be analyzed. Both
the expectational dynamics, as treated in Balasko (1994), and the Wal-
ras’s tatonnement, as in Hens (1997), are considered. Suﬃcient conditions
for stability of the perfect foresight equilibrium within these price forma-
tion mechanisms are derived. We also discuss the issue of the robustness
of the results to parameters used in the truncation.
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers:
Keywords: Expectations, Learning, Overlapping Generations, Computation of
Equilibria.
1 Introduction
Intertemporal economic models are usually intended to describe the actual evo-
lution of economic variables as prices, consumption or capital at equilibrium.
When the assumption of perfect forecast is made, the model itself is used to
compute the equilibrium. The trouble is that the equilibrium is the solution
to a system of equations that involves an inﬁnite number of equations and un-
knowns. In practice this means that “real” consumers are not able to use the
inﬁnite model to compute future prices. An alternative approach is to assume
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1that there is a well behaved and fast mechanism driving the economy to its
temporary equilibrium. Crucial but widely accepted is the assumption that
the two dynamics have a completely diﬀerent speed. On the contrary, there is
no agreement on the nature of the forces driving the economy to the equilib-
rium and on the precise mechanism. A major diﬃculty in describing the “fast”
dynamics is that the behavior of the consumers in a given period depends on
present and future prices. A traditional way to escape this problem is to focus
on steady-states. Another way is to approximate the inﬁnite economy by a ﬁ-
nite economy, an approach often followed when either existence of equilibrium
(Balasko & Shell, 1980) or its actual computation are at stake (Auerbach & Kot-
likoﬀ, 1987). In the paper we assume that agents form expectations about future
variables using truncated versions of the model. The conditions ensuring the
convergence of several price formation mechanisms, such as the expectational
stability introduced in Balasko (1994) or the tatonnement stability (Hens, 1997),
are obtained for truncated OG economies.
However, several problems put in danger this approach. A major concern is that
the temporary equilibrium usually heavily depends on how the agents choose the
terminal conditions when forming the expectations. It is likely that consumers
do agree, at least vaguely, on the terminal conditions. In particular, consumers
might agree that on the long run a stationary equilibrium or a cycle is reached
(for example this is advocated by Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ, 1987). This common
wisdom about the terminal conditions might simply be due to the fact that the
consumers are aware of the diﬃculties associated to non stationary terminal
conditions (regarding computability and coordination). However, this agree-
ment might not be exactly true as there might be some residual heterogeneity
in beliefs. In this case, existence of equilibria is likely to require some kind of
robustness to the terminal conditions.
Insensibility to the terminal conditions is related to dynamic instability. The
stability properties of overlapping generation models have been analyzed exten-
sively. In the simple model as considered by Gale (1973) the dynamic properties
of the steady states are related to the sign and the magnitude of savings at the
monetary steady state. In general models, such a strong result does not hold.
However, there is an open set of initial endowments in which a simple character-
ization of unstable economies is available (see Ghiglino & Tvede, 1995a). The
same kind of result is true when the economy possesses the property of gross
substitutability (Kehoe, Levine et al., 1991). In this way robustness is linked to
the fundamentals of the economy. In the present paper we will see that there
exist economies with equilibria that are at the same time robust to truncation
and posses a stable “fast” dynamics.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, the inﬁnite overlapping
generations economy is presented; in section 3, the properties of truncated over-
lapping generations economies are obtained. In section 4, the mechanism of
price formation, the properties of the related fast “dynamics” and of the com-
position of both dynamics are analyzed. In Section 5, the issue of the robustness
of the results to the choice of terminal conditions is brieﬂy discussed. Section 6
concludes.
22 The model
An overlapping generations model with no production is considered. The econ-
omy begins in period one. In every period, there are ` commodities and a
generation of m consumers is born. Each generation is referred to by its birth
date. The consumers live and have endowments for 2 periods. Consumer i





dowment, !t;i = (!
t+
t;i )1
=0, and a utility function ut;i. The generation born
in period zero has endowment and consumption (X0;i = Y0;i) only for the
period one and receives a money transfer i. The economy is described by
E = (Xs;i;!s;i;us;i;i)
s=0;:::;1
i=1;:::;m . The following assumptions are supposed to be
veriﬁed:
(A1) Yt;i = R`.
(A2) !
t+
t;i 2 R`, with  = 0;1.
(A3) ut;i 2 C1(Xt;i;R) and u
1
t;i (r) is contained in the positive orthant for all
r 2 R+.
(A4) ut;i has strictly positive derivatives, Dut;i 2 C1(Xt;i;R`).
(A5) ut;i has negative deﬁnite Hessian, yTD2ut;i(x)y 2 R for all x 2 Xt;i
and y 2 R` n f0g.






s.t. p(t)  xt
t;i + p(t + 1)  x
t+1
t;i = p(t)  !t
t;i + p(t + 1)  !
t+1
t;i ;
where xt;i = (xt
t;i;x
t+1
t;i ) 2 R2` is the consumption bundle and (p(t);p(t + 1)) 2
R2`
++ the price vector for periods t and t+1. For consumer i, utility maximization
leads to the demand function ft;i : R2`
++  R ! R2`, which has the usual
properties such as homogeneity, boundedness and smoothness.




s.t. p(1)  x1
0;i = p(1)  !1
0;i + i
where i denotes the value of his stock of money.
For consumer i in generation t = 0, utility maximization leads to the demand
function f0;i : R`
++  R ! R`, which has the usual properties such as homo-
geneity, boundedness and smoothness. The aggregate excess demand function
of the period t is deﬁned as:
z1 (p(1);p(2);(!0;i;!1;i;i)i=1;:::;m) = Pm
i=1 f1
0;i (p(1);!0;i;i) + f1
1;i (p(1);p(2);!1;i)  !1
0;i  !1
1;i
zt (p(t  1);p(t);p(t + 1);(!t1;i;!t;i)i=1;:::;m) = Pm
i=1 ft
t1;i (p(t  1);p(t);!t1;i) + ft




3Assuming perfect forecast allows to deﬁne the actual economic equilibrium sim-
ply using the excess demand functions.











z1 (p(1);p(2);(!0;i;!1;i;i)i=1;:::;m) = 0
zt (p(t  1);p(t);p(t + 1);(!t1;i;!t;i)i=1;:::;m) = 0 8 t > 1
A double-ended stationary model is an economy without initial conditions where
all the generations are identical. In this case, following Samuelson (1958), a
steady-state is an equilibrium in which prices are constant up to a scalar across
periods:
Deﬁnition 2 A steady-state is an equilibrium ((p(t))t2Z;(!i)i=1;:::;m) for
which there exists a price p 2 R`
++ and a scalar  2 R++ such that tp = p(t)
for all t 2 Z.
A steady state is called golden rule (or nominal) if  = 1, and it is called
balanced (or real) otherwise. Typically, the debt is diﬀerent from zero in golden
rule steady-states. All economies have at least one golden rule steady-state and
one balanced steady state (see Kehoe & Levine, 1984).
The dynamics of stationary overlapping generations models and in particular
the stability properties of the steady states have been analyzed extensively (e.g.,
Kehoe & Levine, 1984 or Ghiglino & Tvede (1995a,b). In the simple loglinear
economy considered in Duc & Ghiglino (1998), instability of steady-states is
related in a simple way to the individual endowments. Indeed, as soon as the
endowments for the young generation is larger than the endowments for the old
then the monetary steady-state is unstable. When relaxing the assumption of
loglinear utility function, but keeping the model simple, Gale (1973) showed
that the dynamical properties of the steady states are still related to the sign
and the magnitude of savings at the monetary steady state. In the Samuelson
case with small positive savings the monetary steady state is unstable while
it is stable in the Classical case with borrowing. In general models, such a
strong result does not hold. However, there are economies in which a simple
characterization of unstable economies is available. For any given preferences,
there is an open set of initial endowments around the no-trade optimal steady
state in which a simple characterization of unstable economies is available (see
Ghiglino & Tvede, 1995a). It has been shown that in a neighborhood of that
economy the nominal steady state is unique and stable or unstable depending
on whether  is larger or smaller than one at the barter steady state. The
same kind of result is true when the economy possesses the property of gross
substitutability (Kehoe, Levine et al., 1991).
43 Truncated economies and T-equilibria
Motivated by the fact that computation of equilibrium is usually impossible
because it involves an inﬁnite number of unknowns and equations, in the present
paper it is assumed that consumers form expectations by considering a sequence
of truncated overlapping generation economies. Note that truncated economies
were already introduced in the model by Balasko & Shell (1980). The aim of
this part is to pursue a parametrical analysis of the truncated model similarly
as what Balasko (1988) does for the static pure exchange model. In overlapping
generations models, the parametric approach is undertaken ﬁrst by Ghiglino &
Tvede (1995a) and by Balasko & Lang (1998) for steady states of a stationary
economy.
The inﬁnite model can be truncated in diﬀerent ways. Let T be the date of
truncation. In Balasko & Shell (1980) the model is truncated by specifying the
excess demand of the last consumer when old, z
T+1
T (or the aggregate excess
demand in a model with several consumers). The resulting truncated model, has
a determinate equilibrium as can be seen from the fact that there are `(T + 1)
equations and `(T+1) unknowns (the prices). In fact the economy is now almost
equivalent to a usual ﬁnite GE economy with (T +1)m consumers and (T +1)`
commodities. An alternative way to truncate the model is to specify the last
price ˆ p = p(T +1). Clearly, the equilibrium is again determinate since now there
are `T prices to be determined and `T equations. The two ways to truncate
are equivalent. Indeed, consider an equilibrium that is obtained with the ﬁnal
condition ˆ p. This produces an excess demand z
T+1
T that can be obtained by






T;i . The reciprocal also holds
using the fact that the total saving is known, i.e.
P
i i:
We consider an economy composed by all the generations born from time zero
to T: Let P(T + 1) denotes the sequence of the prices from the ﬁrst period to
the period t = T + 1 and Ω(T) denote the endowments (in goods and in value
of money) of all the generations before period T + 1, i.e.
(P(T + 1);Ω(T)) = (p(1);:::;p(T);p(T + 1);(!0;i;:::;!T;i;i)i=1;:::;m)
The equilibrium associated to a truncated economy, i.e. such that the T ﬁrst
excess demands are equal to zero is called a T-equilibrium. Note that there is
no equilibrium condition on the market of the period T + 1.
Deﬁnition 3 A T-equilibrium ((P(T + 1);Ω(T)) is a sequence such that:













5The temporary equilibrium considered here is slightly diﬀerent from the con-
cept used in Balasko & Shell (1980) as there is no restriction on the market
immediately following the truncation. However, the two approaches are seen to
be equivalent. Balasko & Shell (1980) truncate their model by specifying the
demand of generation T in period T + 1. Formally, the truncation parameters
are then (T;z) with z = f
T+1
T (p(T);p(T + 1)). In this way the system of equa-
tions include T` market clearing equations, ` terminal conditions and (T + 1)`
unknown prices. An alternative approach is to specify p(T +1) = p. In this way
the system of equations include T` market clearing equations and T` unknown
prices. The truncation parameters are here (T;p).
A parameterization of the set of T-equilibria by (Ω(T);p(T + 1)) is possible
if this set is a diﬀerential manifold diﬀeomorphic to R(2T+1)m`+`+m. For this
purpose, the following lemma is used.
Lemma 1 (lemma 3.2.1 of Balasko, 1988) Let Γ : X ! Y and  : Y ! X
be two smooth mappings between smooth manifolds such that the composition
Γ : Y ! Y is the identity mapping. Then, the set Z = (Y ), the image of ,
is a smooth submanifold of X diﬀeomorphic to Y .
Lemma 2 The set of T-equilibria ET is a smooth manifold diﬀeomorphic to
R(2T+1)m`+`+m.
Proof: Consider the mapping









0;i + i;p(s)  !s






















and the other mapping
































































fw1;i  ¯ p(2)  ¯ !2



















[ws;i  ¯ p(s + 1)  ¯ !
s+1
s;i  p(s)  !s
s;i]
s = 2;:::;T i = 1;:::;m
where ¯ p(s) denotes the `  1 last coordinates of p(s) and similarly for ¯ !
s+1
s;i .
Obviously, both mappings are smooth and such that
Γ   = idR(2T+1)m`+`+m
Rewriting equations (B:s:i) s = 0;:::;T, deﬁnes wealthiness of every agent
of every generation and therefore equations (A:s) s = 0;:::;T, deﬁne a T-
equilibrium. Thus Im()  ET. Finally, the inclusion ET  Im() is proved by
considering that for any T-equilibrium, the image of the composition of Γ  is
itself. 
3.1 The Jacobian Matrix
To study the Jacobian matrix of a truncated economy, it is worthwhile consid-






















The usual properties yield as they are due to the maximization problem; thus
this matrix is symmetric semi-deﬁnite negative. Moreover it will be useful to
consider the Slutsky matrices in the space of the prices of the goods of the ﬁrst
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if j;k = (s + 1)` + 1;:::;(s + 2)`
0 otherwise
If Ms;s+1
s denotes the `  ` of Slutsky coeﬃcients of the demand for the goods
in period s with respect to the prices of period s + 1, the Slutsky matrix may






































































Lemma 3 The matrix M(T) is symmetric deﬁnite negative, except for the non
generical case of nihil aggregate expenses in the period T + 1.
Proof: The Slutsky matrix for generation s = 0;:::;T  1 is semi deﬁnite
negative and its rank is equal either to 2`1 for s = 1;:::;T 1 or to `1 for
s = 0 (see Balasko, 1988). However, for the generation born in period T, the
Slutsky matrix considered in a truncated economy is a principal submatrix of a
deﬁnite negative matrix. Thus, as the matrix M(T) is a diagonal block matrix,










+ x0(T)MTx(T) > 0
Therefore, the matrix M(T) is deﬁnite negative. Finally, taking into account
that the matrix M(T) is the sum of symmetric matrices Ns proves that M(T)
is symmetric. 
As the set of T-equilibrium ET may be parameterized by (Ω(T);p(T +1)), con-






























where J0 is a `  ` matrix and J1 a (T  1)`  (T  1)` matrix.
Lemma 4 The Jacobian matrix can be decomposed as follows:































9with  = 0; = 1 when s = 1,  = 0; = 0 when s = T and  = 0;1 and  = 0;1
when s = 2;:::;T  1. The two ﬁrst elements are the Slutsky coeﬃcient. The
last part of the decomposition for the whole truncated economy may be written
as
PT
s=0 Ks(T) Y s(T) where Ks(T)
T`1
= (kj













@w0;i j = 1;:::;`









@wT j = (T  1)` + 1;:::;T`



























0;i j  `









T j = (T  1)` + 1;:::;T`

















s;i j = (s + 1)` + 1;:::;(s + 2)`
0 otherwise
with s = 2;:::;T. 
3.2 Fibers and no trade T-equilibrium










R(2T+1)`m+m that satisﬁes the following equations:
p(1)  !1
0;i + i = w0;i i = 1;:::;m
p(s)  !s
s;i + p(s + 1)  !
s+1




0;i (p(1);w0;i)  f1




s1;i (p(s  1);p(s);ws1;i)
fs
s;i (p(s);p(s + 1);ws;i) = 0 s = 2;:::;T
Lemma 5 Fibers are linear manifolds of dimension:
m` + T ((m  1)` + m(`  1))
10Proof: According to the two last sets of equations, the endowments of agent












s;j s = 1;:::;T
Moreover, by the budget equations:





p1(s+1)[ws;i  ¯ p(s + 1)  ¯ !
s+1
s;i  p(s)  !s
s;i]
s = 1;:::;T i = 1;:::;m

Lemma 6 Every T-equilibrium belongs to only one ﬁber.
Proof: The unique ﬁber containing a T-equilibrium (P(T + 1);Ω(T)), is the
ﬁber associated to w0;i = p(1)  !1
0;i + i, ws;i = p(s)  !s
s;i + p(s + 1)  !
s+1
s;i . 
Deﬁnition 5 The T-equilibrium (P(T + 1);Ω(T)) is a no-trade T-equilibrium
if the following equalities are true:
f1
0;i(p(1);p(1)  !0;i + i) = !0;i
fs;i

p(s);p(s + 1);p(s)  !s




= !s;i i = 1;:::;m
s = 1;:::;T
Lemma 7 A no-trade T-equilibrium is such that i = 0 8 i.
Proof: A no-trade T-equilibrium satisﬁes by deﬁnition
p(1)  f1
0;i(p(1);w0;i) = p(1)  !1
0;i
Walras = p(1)  f1
0;i(p(1);w0;i)  i

Lemma 8 The set of no trade T-equilibria TT is a smooth submanifold of E
diﬀeomorphic to R(T+1)(`+m)1.
Proof: When considering real equilibria, i.e. with i = 0 8 i, p1(1) may be
chosen as the new numeraire by homogeneity of demand functions and S =
f1g  R(T+1)`1 is the set of normalized prices. Consider now:





















p(1)  !0;i;p(s)  !s






Clearly, Γ  Ξ = idSR(T+1)m and by Walras Ξ(S  R(T+1)m) = TT. The proof
is then a direct consequence of lemma 1. 
11Lemma 9 Every ﬁber contains only one no trade T-equilibrium.









is a no trade T-equilibrium belonging to the ﬁber. Moreover, it is unique because
as the demand functions are bijective, Ξ is bijective as well and the inverse
mapping restricted to TT is Γ. 
Lemma 10 The Jacobian matrix at a no trade T-equilibrium is symmetric def-
inite negative.
Proof: Obvious when seeing lemma 3 and lemma 4. 
3.3 Existence of T-equilibrium
Lemma 11 The aggregate excess demand mapping Z : RT` ! RT` is proper.
Proof: Consider the compact set B() deﬁned as
B() = fx 2 RT` j x  ; (xj)j=2(k1)`+1;:::;2k`  x
2k1
with k = 1;:::; T
2 if T is even, or with
k = 1;:::; T1
2 and (xj)j=(T1)`+1;:::;T`  (x
;j
T )j=1;:::;` if T is odd.g
where x
2k1 < (j)j=2(k1)`+1;:::;2k`) denotes the lower bound of the set of
consumption bundle preferred by agent of type i = 1 born in period 2k  1 to
his own endowment. By continuity of Z(P(t)) the inverse image Z1(B()) is




0;i (p(1);w0;i) + f1
1;i (p(1);p(2);w1;i) = (xj)j=1;:::;`  (j)j=1;:::;` Pm
i=1 fs
s1;i (p(s  1);p(s);ws;i) + fs
















2k1  f2k1;1 (p(2k  1);p(2k);w2k1;1)  (j)j=2(k1)`+1;:::;2k`
with k = 1;:::; T




T1;i (p(T  1);p(T);wT1;i)  (j)j=(T1)`+1;:::;T`
if T is odd. Finally consider the set:
12D() =


















































if T is odd.

where s;i denotes the Lagrangian multiplier of the maximization problem of
the agent of type i born in period s. D() is a compact set by continuity and
the strict monotonicity1 of the utility function. As B() is included in D(),
B() is also a compact set. 
Lemma 12 The proper mappings ZΩ(T);p(T+1) and ZΩ0(T);p0(T+1) are properly
homotopic.
Proof: The proof is an adaptation of the proof of lemma 5.5.4 of Balasko (1988),
just consider F : RT`  [0;1] ! RT` deﬁned by:
F(p(1);:::;p(T);) = ZΩ(T);p(T+1) (p(1);:::;p(T))
with
!s;i() = (1  )!s;i + !0
s;i i() = (1  )i + 0
i
p(T + 1) = (1  )p(T + 1) + p0(T + 1)

A consequence of lemma 12 is that both mappings have the same modulo 2
degree.
Theorem 1 For any (Ω(T);p(T + 1)) there exists a T-equilibrium.
Proof: From the invariance of degree by homotopy, the degree of the mapping
associated to an endowment associated to a no trade T-equilibrium is the same
as any other aggregated excess demand mapping. There exists only one equi-
librium associated to such an endowment and the associated price is the unique
supporting price. This unique pre-image of zero for the aggregated excess de-
mand mapping is such that the Jacobian matrix is deﬁnite negative by lemma
10. Thus zero is a regular value and the modulo two degree of the aggregated
excess demand is equal to one. Consequently Z is onto and the inverse image
Z1(0) is non empty. 
Remark: There are no restrictions on “ the real value ” of the stock of money in
the period T +1, as the equilibrium conditions do not yield after the truncature
time. Therefore there always exists an T-equilibrium for any ﬁxed value of the
stock of money and for any ﬁnal condition ¯ p.
1which implies s;1 6= 0
134 Expectational Dynamics
In this section some mechanisms of price formation are considered. It is sup-
posed that consumers form expectations using the truncated form of the model.
This assumption relies on the fact that only a ﬁnite time is available to the
consumers in order to solve the system of equations so that only a ﬁnite system
can be used.
4.1 The W-dynamics
Suppose that consumers form expectations about future prices using market
clearing conditions for future markets and today prices. In this case today’s
excess demand becomes a function of solely today’s prices. Then, provided that
the expectation function possesses some smoothness it is possible to extend the
walrasian tatonnement to the present model. The resulting dynamics is called
the W-dynamics. The sum-up, the main assumption of the W-dynamics is that
the Walrasian tatonnement prevails on the market of period one, which is open,
and that future spot markets are used to anticipate future prices. In particular,
the agents born in t = 1 anticipate the price of period t = 2 in such a way
that all the future markets are cleared up to the truncature. Note that here we
specify the truncature in real terms.
Deﬁnition 6 Given (Ω(T);z), the rational expectations forward correspondence
'
z : R` ! R(T1)` associates with the price vector p(1) the anticipated prices
denoted by qe(T) = (pe(2);:::;pe(T)) such that:
Z (p(1);qe(T)) = 0
where Z = (z2;:::;zT) and z = z
T+1
T is the excess demand by consumer T in
period T + 1 .
Clearly, the price vector p(1) is explicitly involved only in the second period mar-
ket, i.e. in z2(p(1);pe(2);pe(3)). Consider now '
z(pe(1)) 3 qe(T) denotes the
expectation correspondence such the markets from t = 2 to t = T are cleared.
Moreover, 'z(p(1)) 3 pe(2) are the ﬁrst ` elements of '
z. The equilibrium
condition of the ﬁrst period is then:












The expectational correspondence may take multiple values in which case the
mathematical analysis becomes more complex. However, the stability analyzed
here is local and the existence of a local smooth selection not only simplify the
mathematical diﬃculties, but also ensures continuity of expectations.
Deﬁnition 7 A T-equilibrium is W-regular if jJ1j 6= 0.
Lemma 13 For every W-regular T-equilibrium, there exists a local smooth se-
lection z(p(1)) of the correspondence 'z(p(1)).
14Proof: As the function Zz(p(1);qe) veriﬁes the condition of the implicit function
theorem and j @Z




























































































Remark: The equilibrium prices for the whole future is included in the expec-







on all these prices..
Lemma 14 The set ETW of W-regular T-equilibria is an open and dense subset
of the equilibrium manifold ET.















(P(T + 1);Ω(T)) as the set of coordinates of the ﬁber, as shown in lemma 5.
Moreover lemma 9 and 10, ensures any ﬁber to contain a no trade T-equilibrium
whose Jacobian matrix is deﬁnite negative. Thus, any principal submatrix of
J(T) like J0 is deﬁnite negative. 
Lemma 15 A W-regular equilibrium is W-stable if all the eigenvalues of the
matrix H = J0  J2J
1
1 J3 are strictly negative or has a strictly negative part.












recall that an equilibrium is tatonnement stable, if every eigenvalue of the Ja-















Lemma 16 The set of W-stable T-equilibria ETWs has a non-empty interior
which contains the set of no trade T-equilibrium.
Proof: By lemma 10, at the no trade T-equilibrium, the Jacobian matrix is
symmetric deﬁnite negative. Thus, the matrix H is negative deﬁnite (see Bal-
asko (1994), proof of lemma 14) and therefore every eigenvalue is strictly neg-
ative. The continuity of the roots of the characteristic polynomial ensures this
property for economy close to the no trade. 
15Finally, we consider the gross substitutes T-equilibria (for a deﬁnition of GS-
equilibria, see deﬁnition 15 of Balasko, 1994).
Lemma 17 Every GS-T-equilibrium is W-stable.
Proof: Lemmas 18 and 20 of Balasko (1994) establish that for gross substitute
equilibria, the matrix H is a P-matrix, i.e. a non-singular semi-deﬁnite positive
matrix. Thus, the eigenvalues are all strictly positive. 
4.2 The T-dynamics
The T-dynamic introduced in Balasko (1994) for a two period Arrow-Debreu
model, is generated by the diﬀerent dynamics prevailing on the diﬀerent markets.
In this sense, the W-dynamic may be seen as a particular case of this general
idea. The T-dynamic is deﬁned by the correspondence Θz which is the compo-
sition of the expectational correspondence '
z and the backward correspondence
Ψz, the later associating any given expectation price to an equilibrium price
of the open market. As before, the study of a local smooth selection z of Θz
is economically relevant and mathematically convenient. Such a selection ex-
ists if both selections of the expectation correspondence and of the backward
correspondence exist.
Deﬁnition 8 Given ((!0;i;:::;!T;i;i)i;z), the equilibrium backward correspon-
dence Ψz : R` ! R(T1)` associates with the anticipated prices qe(T) =
(pe(2);:::;pe(T)) the price vector p(1) such that
z0 (p(1);pe(2)) = 0
Deﬁnition 9 A T-equilibrium is T-regular if the product of jJ0j and jJ1j is
diﬀerent from zero.
Lemma 18 For every T-regular T-equilibrium, there exists a local smooth se-
lection z(p(1)) of the correspondence Θˆ p(p(1)).
Proof: See lemma 13 for z and the implicit function theorem for  . 
For any given couple2 (p(1);z), agents form their expectations of pe(2);= z(p(1))
that clear future markets. Then, they revise the prices of the ﬁrst period
 (pe(2)) = p(1) such that the open market is cleared. This adjustment pro-
cess goes on until an equilibrium is reached, which corresponds to a ﬁxed point
p(1) of z.
Lemma 19 The set ETE of T-regular T-equilibria is an open and dense subset
of the equilibrium manifold ET.
Proof: The proof follows the proof of lemma 14. 
The results of Balasko (1994) may be directly applied. First, a T-regular T-
equilibrium is expectationally stable if all the eigenvalues of the matrix K =
2As in Balasko (1994), “we assume throughout this section that expectations
are identical across economic agents and that there is no uncertainty”. Thus,






1 J3 have modulus strictly less than one. Then, the set ETEs of T-
regular stable T-equilibria has a non empty interior which contains the set of
no-trade equilibria. And every Gs-T-equilibria is expectationally stable.
As already mentioned, the W-dynamics may be seen as a particular case of
the T-dynamic of Balasko, in the sense that both are compositions of diﬀer-
ent dynamics. However, it is obvious that ETW  ETE and near the no-trade
T-equilibrium both stabilities are equivalent (see Theorem 7.7.3 of Horn & John-
son, 1985).
4.3 Other Dynamics
As a conclusion, some other dynamics concepts may be considered. The ﬁrst one
follows the line of Balasko as it considers also a composition of two dynamics.
The two other concepts are simply the Walrasian tatonnement and the Hicksian
stability applied to a truncated economy where the markets of the T periods
are open.
In the W-dynamic, it was assumed that the Walrasian tatonnement prevails
in the open market. Instead, suppose that tatonnement stability is replaced
Hicksian stability. The associated dynamic on the open market is then called
the H-dynamic. An equilibrium is H-stable if the opposite of the Jacobian matrix
of the excess demand is the opposite of a P-matrix (see Gale & Nikaido, 1965,
for an analysis of P-matrices). Obviously, the Jacobian matrix of the market
with expectation is the matrix H and therefore a T-equilibrium is H-stable, if
the matrix H is a P-matrix.
Finally, the assumption of dynamic composition may be dropped by assuming
that the open market and the spot market are aggregated in one general market
(this is in fact a point of view of Shell, 1971, when he explains the failure of the
First Theorem of Welfare Economics). The two usual stability concepts when
applied to this aggregated market give rise to the global Walrasian tatonnement
stability and the global Hicksian stability.
Lemma 20 For a non empty set which contains the set of no trade T-equili-
brium, the global Walrasian tatonnement is equivalent to the global Hicksian
stability.
Proof: Recall that an equilibrium is Hicksian stable if the Jacobian matrix J
is a P-matrix and that a symmetric deﬁnite positive matrix is a P-matrix.
Lemma 21 If a T-equilibrium is Hicksian stable, it is H stable.
Proof: Lemma 18 of Balasko (1994) ensures that if the matrix J is a P-matrix,
the matrix H is a P-matrix. 
Lemma 22 There exists a non empty set which contains the set of no trade T-
equilibrium and included in the set of T-regular T-equilibria ETr, which satisﬁes
the tatonnement Walrasian, the Hicksian stability, the expectational stability,
the H-stability and the W-stability.
Proof: Obvious, when seeing lemmas 16, 20 and 21 
Consider the Jacobian matrix J of an economy with one good for the ﬁrst period
market, and two goods for the next period market. In this simplest case, as the
17matrix H is a scalar, the H-stability is equivalent to the W-stability. But assume














then the matrix H = m22 m32m23
m33 . If H < 0 with m33 > 0 then the equilibrium
associated is H-stable, but not Hicksian stable. Moreover, it is obvious in this
case that W-stability does not imply expectational stability.
5 Robustness to truncation
The rationale behind truncation is that, in order to form the expectations about
future prices, consumers face the impossible task of solving the inﬁnite number
of equations and of knowing the inﬁnite sequence of the fundamentals of the
economy. In other words, truncating the model is justiﬁed either by the bounded
rationality due to limited computational power or by a lack of information about
the far future. The ﬁrst prices of an equilibrium of the whole inﬁnite model can
always be approximated by an equilibrium of a truncated economy with a correct
choice in the ﬁnal prices. Thus, as a remark in Balasko and Shell (1980) points
out: “each Walrasian equilibrium (of the inﬁnite model) can be found as the
limit of a truncated economy for some positive sequence z
t+1
t ”. However, we are
left with the problem of the choice of the actual terminal conditions. Clearly, a
certain kind of robustness to the choice of the terminal condition is desirable.
The economy should be such that early prices are not very sensitive to the choice
of terminal conditions.
Generally, no restriction holds on ﬁnal conditions, except for strict positiveness
of prices and demand. In this sense, the choice of ˆ p or z is completely arbi-
trary, as was implicitly assumed in the expectations considered in Grandmont
& Laroque (1985). Of course, some choices of ﬁnal conditions seem more rea-
sonable than others on economic and “informational” grounds. In particular,
consumers might agree that a long run equilibrium is reached after a certain
time, i.e. a cycle or a steady state (this is advocated by Auerbach & Kotlikoﬀ,
1987). However, it is likely that agents at least slightly disagree on the exact
conditions prevailing after period T and therefore on the value of the variables
at truncation. As the expected prices in the early periods depend on the ﬁnal
conditions there will be disagreement between the agents the model becom-
ing “pathological” . Clearly, a certain kind of robustness to the choice of the
terminal condition is desirable.
Insensitivity to the ﬁnal conditions is related to the stability properties of the
equilibrium path. This fact was already pointed out by several authors. For
example, Kehoe and Levine (1990) asserts that: “instability...manifest itself
as...the larger the truncation date the less sensitive prices early in the price path
are to terminal conditions ”. In particular, paths outgoing from an unstable
18steady state are characterized by insensibility to the terminal conditions. On
the contrary, path converging to a stable steady state are extremely sensitive
on the terminal condition, at least on the early periods.
The connection between stability and sensibility can be better understood by
considering the backward dynamics, as in this case forward terminal conditions
can be seen as backward initial conditions. Clearly, equilibria converging in
backward time to a steady state are not very sensitive to the backward initial
conditions (i.e. the forward terminal conditions). On the contrary, equilibria
diverging in backward from the steady state are very sensitive to the backward
initial conditions. Since, as shown by Grandmont & Laroque (1986), a forward
stable equilibrium is backward unstable and reciprocally, equilibria starting in a
neigborhood of a forward unstable steady state are characterized by insensibility
to the terminal conditions. On the other hand, for equilibria starting close to
a forward perfect foresight stable steady state, a small uncertainty about the
value of that steady state has a huge impact on the early periods. To sum
up, forward unstable path posses the required “robustness” property for the
existence of early equilibrium prices under diﬀerent ﬁnal conditions. This is
reminiscent of the feature shared by many models that stable steady states are
unstable under learning.
Finally, in the paper we considered two diﬀerent type of truncation, i.e. spec-
ifying the ﬁnal price or the ﬁnal excess demand. What can be said about the
robustness of these two procedure? Consider the case of an equilibrium path
corresponding to a path that is generated by an unstable steady state. In case
prices explode (or collapse) the robustness in prices seems diﬀerent to that in
allocations. However, this is false. This can be seen on the dynamical curve of
the simple stationary model. Indeed, since the nominal quantity of money is
ﬁxed, ﬁxing the terminal price is equivalent to ﬁx the position on the dynamical
curve which is equivalent to ﬁx the excess demand in the old age in real terms.
Now, a spread in the ﬁnal price will have a similar eﬀect to a spread in the ﬁnal
excess demand, of course the eﬀect of the two spreads are proportional but not
identical. In the rest of the paper we will consider terminal conditions on the




In intertemporal economies it is possible, if not natural, to consider that mar-
kets for present and for future commodities are diﬀerent in nature and therefore
should be separated. In particular, as pointed out by Balasko (1994) and Hens
(1998), a speciﬁc dynamics may prevail on each market. However, a consistent
requirement is that the spot market is used to solve computationally the fore-
casting problem, i.e. compute tomorrow prices for given today prices. In an
overlapping generation model, this involves to truncate the economy. Indeed,
when imposing some ﬁnal conditions, the gorden knot is cut. Not surprisingly
most economists who adopt the OG model to make forecasts (see for example
Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ, 1987), use truncated models. Since there are many pos-
sible choices for ﬁnal conditions, it is unlikely that not fully informed agents will
19agree on the same terminal condition. The steady state hypothesis seems then
a natural coordination procedure in this setup. However, expectations should
not be to sensitive to the actual choice of the terminal condition. Provided
the economy posses this robustness, the mechanisms of price adjustment may
be analyzed using the concept of expectational dynamics as treated in Balasko
(1994) and the Walras’s tatonnement (as in Hens (1997)).
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